The trade-policy framework that has emerged over the past several years has been increasingly aggressive in targeting specific industries and jurisdictions for tariff, restriction, and incentive treatment. The aggressiveness has been visible; the operational results have been more uneven than the framing of the policy successes has suggested.
What targeting well requires
Targeting well requires several things that are difficult to do consistently across the legislative and administrative process. It requires identifying the specific industries that are strategically important without sweeping in ones that are merely politically connected. It requires calibrating the instruments to the specific objective rather than to the broader rhetorical purpose. It requires maintaining the targeting through the implementation cycle rather than allowing it to expand as additional constituencies seek inclusion.
What has been done well
The semiconductor-policy work has, on most rigorous reads, been the area where the targeting has been most disciplined. The categories of equipment, materials, and applications that the relevant restrictions cover have been carefully defined; the implementation has, with notable consistency, stayed close to the original definitions.
What has been done less well
The targeting in other sectors has been less consistent. Several of the broader tariff actions over the past several years have included categories that are difficult to justify on strategic-targeting grounds; the politics of inclusion has expanded the scope past the original analytical foundation in ways that have produced operational consequences without offsetting strategic benefits.
What this means in practice
The practical implication is that the broader trade framework should be evaluated category-by-category rather than as a single coherent policy. Some categories are working; others are not; the overall assessment depends on weighing them carefully rather than on broader narratives about the framework's overall efficacy.
The recommendation
This board recommends that the next phase of trade policy emphasise rigorous evaluation of which targeting decisions are achieving their stated strategic objectives and which are not, with the policy adjustments following the evaluation rather than preceding it. The work is operationally less attractive than the announcement of new targeting; it is more likely to produce policies that work.